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Davey's Deviant Discretion:
An Incorporated Establishment Clause Should Require
the State to Maintain Funding Neutrality
NINA S. SCHULTZ
INTRODUCTION
In February 2004, the Supreme Court decided Locke v. Davey,' holding that the
State of Washington could exclude theology majors from scholarship money it made
available to all other college students who met otherwise neutral criteria.2 The Court
rejected Davey's claim that this practice constituted a discriminatory burden on his
Free Exercise right to practice his religion, reasoning that Davey could stillpractice his
religion. Davey was a departure from many other Rehnquist Court funding cases that
involved the Religion Clauses, in that religion was excluded from funding rather than
included. This Note argues that the Davey decision implicated not only the Free
Exercise Clause, but more importantly, the Establishment Clause, which embodies a
principle of neutrality with respect to government action among religions and between
religion and nonreligion.
The State of Washington did not adhere to the neutrality principle when it excluded
only theology majors, specifically excluding religion from the benefit made available
to all others. The Davey Court placed the controversy within the "play in the joints"
between the Religion Clauses, conferring discretion upon the states with respect to
religious liberties.4 But this runs contrary to the concept of an incorporated
Establishment Clause. By giving the State of Washington the discretion to exclude
Davey from a benefit made available to all others based solely on his choice to pursue
his religious convictions through a theology degree, the Court hearkened back to the
pre-incorporation era when each state could and did regulate religion within its own
borders. Either the Court has implicitly decided that the Establishment Clause is not
fully incorporated, returning discretion to the states in religious matters, or the Court
did not fully address the implications of the federal Establishment Clause and its
neutrality principles in Locke v. Davey.
Part I of this Note will trace the history of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, analyze the Court's increasing use of the neutrality principle, and
explain what the neutrality principle does, or should do, for a religious adherent. Part II
will detail the facts ofDavey and analyze its holding, followed by a discussion of how
the Court departed from the Establishment Clause's neutrality principle in the case.
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 2003, Baylor
University. I would like to thank Professor Daniel 0. Conkle as well as the Indiana Law Journal
associates and editorial board for their efforts and comments. In addition, this could not have
been possible without the constant support and thoughtful insights of Braden Core and Lindsay
Jaffee. Most of all, I wish to express gratitude to my mother, Mary Kay Schultz, for her endless
encouragement and inspiration.
1. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
2. Id. at 719.
3. Id. at 720.
4. Id. at 719.
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Part III will reevaluate the Establishment Clause and its force on the states. It will
question the incorporation of the Establishment Clause and discuss the neutrality
principle in light of Davey. This Note will conclude by arguing that an incorporated
Establishment Clause requires each state to afford its citizens the protections of the
Clause-that is, neutrality.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... 5 The
meaning of the Establishment Clause has evolved to confer certain rights and to
accommodate religious liberties, while ensuring against the abuses resulting from
entanglement of religion and the government. There is little record of the Founders'
specific intent for the Establishment Clause as to how narrowly or broadly one should
read the Clause. The Court's modem journey of interpreting and applying the
Establishment Clause to the religious claims of today's society began with the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause over fifty years ago.
Two principles protected by the Establishment Clause are religious liberty and
religious equality. Religious liberty pertains to the freedom of choice by both the
religious and the irreligious, whose choices are to remain free from government
influence.6 A similar protection, religious equality, prohibits distinctions by the
government among religions and also between religion and irreligion.7 The Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has consistently referred to yet another principle:
neutrality. Neutrality by government actors both among religions and between religion
and irreligion has the power to protect both religious liberty and religious equality, but
only if implemented correctly. Religion Clause scholars, such as Professors Daniel 0.
Conide and Douglas Laycock, have referred to the neutrality principle as one to which
the Court has adhered in the past and should continue adhering to in the future to
protect both religious liberty and religious equality.
8
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Daniel 0. Conlde, Indirect Funding and the Establishment Clause: Rehnquist's
Triumphant Vision ofNeutrality andPrivate Choice, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 54, 57 (Craig
Bradley ed., 2006).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conlde, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the
Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000);
Douglas Laycock, Comment: Theology Scholarships, the Pledge ofAllegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARv. L. REv. 156 (2004)
[hereinafter Laycock, Theology Scholarships]; Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAuL L. REv. 993 (1990) [hereinafter
Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion]. Cf Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV.
489 (2004) (arguing that a modified form of substantive neutrality, rather than formal neutrality,
is the best course of action).
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A. The Founders 'Intent
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment were included in the Bill of Rights by
America's Founding Fathers to ensure against abuses that inevitably result from a
governmental establishment of religion.9 The first colonists came to the New World to
escape religious persecution and in pursuit of religious freedom, aspirations that the
Religion Clauses were intended to protect.' 0 As mandated by each colony's charter, the
colonists suffered the imposition of taxes used to support the Crown-established
churches in each colony." The financial support of each state's established church
continued even after the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of both the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 12 Virginia was at the forefront of the movement to
end this practice. In the 1785-86 legislative session, Virginia legislators, led by
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, enacted Jefferson's "Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty."' 3 This Bill, spurred also by Madison's Remonstrance against taxes used for
the church, stated that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical... no man shall
be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry
whatsoever .... Many constitutional scholars, including justices of the Supreme
Court, have used this and other language from the Virginia bill, conceptualized by two
of America's founding fathers, to support the belief that the Framers of the Bill of
Rights wished to erect, "in the words of [Thomas] Jefferson .... a wall of separation
between church and State"'15 and thus, that the Religion Clauses were meant to further a
separationist theory of church-state relations.
16
As ratified in 1791, the First Amendment embodied a sense of federalism.
According to the specific language and the function of the Bill of Rights, the First
Amendment only applied to the federal government-incorporation through the
Fourteenth Amendment had not yet occurred.17 Furthermore, the Establishment Clause
9. KATHLEEN M. SULLivAN & GERALD wGuN R CONSTunONAL LAw 1504-05(15th ed.
2004). See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1947).
10. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-13.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 13 (quoting Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (2005)).
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 13. But see Daniel 0. Conkle, Legal Theory: Toward a General Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1130-31 (1988). Conde cites the dissenting
opinion of then-Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), that contested this
historical account, arguing that Jefferson neither took part, nor was present, in the drafting and
ratification of the Bill of Rights. Madison, on the other hand, conceived the Establishment
Clause "to prohibit the establishment of a national religion." See id. at 98 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
17. Most provisions of the first eight amendments--excluding the Second and Third
Amendments, the Grand Jury Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Seventh
Amendment-have been incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause and
other protections, such as the concept of "liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment,
ratified in 1868. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 1508. The incorporation of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is discussed infra Parts I.B., III.A.
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of the First Amendment is the only amendment in the Bill of Rights to specifically
name Congress as the body of government upon which the Amendment places
limitations.' 8 The founders enacted the Establishment Clause under the belief that the
states would remain the protectors of religious liberties. This federalism component of
the Establishment Clause is further evidenced by the history of state-established
churches, which continued to exist well after the enactment of the First Amendment.'
9
The final state church to disestablish was that of Massachusetts in 1833.20 Other than
the specific language of the Establishment Clause and the historical evidence of state-
established churches, the remaining evidence of the Framers' intent for the
Establishment Clause is "woefully incomplete.' Justice Clark, of the United States
Supreme Court, said of the Establishment Clause in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp,22
A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers... seems to me futile
and misdirected... the historical record is at best ambiguous, and statements can
readily be found to support either side of the proposition....
... [O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than
were our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today
the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously .... 23
Without clear evidence of the original intent of the meaning of the Establishment
Clause, the Supreme Court was forced to decide whether the Establishment Clause
applies to the states through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
answered this question in its first modem Establishment Clause challenge: Everson v.
Board of Education.24
18. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... U.S. CONST.
amend. I. See also Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A
Federalist View, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1700, 1707 (1992) [hereinafter A Federalist View].
19. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 1508. See also Conkle, supra note 16, at 1132-
34 (arguing that the Establishment Clause was a reflection of the national government's "limited
and enumerated powers, and these powers did not extend to matters of religion"); A Federalist
View, supra note 18, at 1703 (arguing that "the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent
Congress from interfering with the established state churches and with state efforts to
accommodate religion").
20. William P. Gray, Jr., The Ten Commandments and the Ten Amendments: A Case Study
in Religious Freedom in Alabama, 49 AlA. L. REv. 509, 519 (1998) (citation omitted).
Disestablishment in Massachusetts occurred forty-four years after drafting of the Establishment
Clause. Id.
21. Conkle, supra note 16, at 1132-33 (positing that the only agreement of the ratifying
states was that Congress could have no power to enact laws concerning religion, which
protected separationist states, such as Virginia, and states that maintained established religions).
22. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
23. Id. at 237-40.
24. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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B. Incorporation of the Establishment Clause
The Court in Everson declared the incorporation of the Establishment Clause,
applying its force to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 The doctrine of
incorporation ensures the protection of "fundamental liberties" from state infringement
through the Fourteenth Amendment just as the Bill of Rights amendments protect these
liberties from infringement by the federal government.26 It should be noted, however,
that an incorporated Establishment Clause does not comport with two of the original
rationales behind the Establishment Clause: to prevent the federal government from
interfering with state-protected religious liberties and to ensure that the federal
government would not disestablish the official state churches. 27 The state lost its power
to regulate religious liberty without interference by the federal government after
incorporation; similarly, religious liberties protected by some states could also violate
the incorporated Establishment Clause. Thus, the original rationales for the
Establishment Clause are now compromised to the extent the First Amendment
safeguarded state power in religious affairs. Clearly, a state-established church would
be contrary to an incorporated Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, the Court in
Everson saw the need to protect state accommodation of religion and found a way to
do so through incorporation of the Establishment Clause, applying the principles of the
federal Establishment Clause to the states. 28 But there is little evidence that the Framers
of the First Amendment intended the Establishment Clause to be applied to the states.
29
On the contrary, there is direct evidence that legislators in office soon after the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend for the Amendment to
incorporate the Establishment Clause. In 1875, eight years after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress proposed another amendment to the United States
Constitution. The first clause of the projected "Blaine Amendment," named after
Congressman James G. Blaine who proposed the amendment, was an explicit
application of the federal Establishment Clause to the states.30 The amendment passed
25. Id. at 14-15 (reasoning that, given the application of the Free Exercise Clause to the
states through Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), a likewise application of the
Establishment Clause to the states is warranted).
26. See, e.g., A Federalist View, supra note 18, at 1708.
27. See supra notes 9-21 and accompanying text; SULLiVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at
1508; Conkle, supra note 16, at 1132-1134 (arguing that the Establishment Clause was a
reflection of the national government's "limited and enumerated powers, and these powers did
not extend to matters of religion"); A Federalist View, supra note 18, at 1703 (arguing that "the
Establishment Clause was intended to prevent Congress from interfering with the established
state churches and with state efforts to accommodate religion.").
28. In Everson, a New Jersey taxpayer challenged the validity of a statute that authorized
boards of education to make decisions concerning the transportation of children to and from
school and the specific school board's policy of giving reimbursement for such transportation to
parents of children in parochial schools. The Court held that the statute and policy of the school
board did not violate the Establishment Clause, despite the wall of separation between church
and state mandated by the Establishment Clause and applied to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-18.
29. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
30. See Conkle, supra note 16, at 1137-38; A Federalist View, supra note 18, at 1713; J.
Scott Slater, Florida's "Blaine Amendment" and Its Effect on Educational Opportunities, 33
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in the House of Representatives, but did not gamer the required supermajority vote in
the Senate. 31 Congress voted on the amendment nineteen times between 1875 and
1930, each time resulting in defeat. 32 Since the Blaine Amendment was introduced only
eight years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, its defeat may reflect
that a majority of Congress did not intend the Establishment Clause to be applied to the
states when it enacted the Fourteenth Amendment.
33
Many states enacted their own "Blaine Amendments" into their state constitutions to
preserve a policy of anti-establishment in the state. Some state anti-establishment
provisions are more restrictive than the prohibitions in the United States Constitution.
Perhaps these more restrictive states are exercising their powers as the regulators of
affairs between church and state, but it is arguable that this power was taken from the
states when the Court declared the incorporation of the Establishment Clause in
Everson.
34
C. The Court's Move Toward Neutrality
Everson, the first major, modem Establishment Clause challenge to appear before
the Court,35 upheld bus fare funding for children of both public and parochial schools.
Along with the doctrines of incorporation and separation between church and state,
Justice Black extolled a principle that the Court presently refers to as neutrality: "[The
First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.
State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor
them., 36 Though not a pervasive goal of the Court during its separationist era,
commencing with Everson, the trend toward enforcing neutrality began in the 1960s
37
and has become increasingly important in the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine.
Beginning with the bans of school-led prayer 38 and school-led Bible readings, 39 the
Court began to use the Establishment Clause neutrality principle to invalidate practices
STETSON L. Rnv. 581, 584 (2004). The proposed amendment read:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the
support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public
lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor
shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects
or denominations.
See 4 CONG. REc. 205 (1875).
31. Slater, supra note 30, at 591.
32. A Federalist View, supra note 18, at 1714.
33. See id. at 1713-14; see also Conkle, supra note 16, at 1137-38. The closeness in time
is, of course, not dispositive of the drafters' intent for the Fourteenth Amendment.
34. Conkle, supra note 16, at 1137-38. See A Federalist View, supra note 18, at 1709
(arguing that the incorporation of the Establishment Clause eliminates state authority over
religion); infra note 79 and accompanying text.
35. Conkle, supra note 16, at 1124.
36. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
37. Conkle, supra note 8, at 6. Professor Conkle describes this neutrality among religions as
denominational equality, which is a portion of the broad neutrality concept. Id. at 9.
38. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
39. School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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that favored one denomination over another.40 The neutrality concept was prevalent in
Free Exercise cases dealing with unemployment compensation for which Saturday
Sabbatarians who were fired for refusing to work on the Saturday Sabbath were not
eligible.4 1 Denominational neutrality, the view that the government may not favor or
disfavor one religious denomination over another, expanded into a concept of
neutrality between religion and nonreligion beginning in the 1970s.
The Court in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York42 stated that the Religion
Clauses precluded the Court from "tolerat[ing] either governmentally established
religion or governmental interference with religion. Short ofthose expressly proscribed
governmental acts there is room for 'play in the joints' productive of a benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference.', 3 Then-Chief Justice Burger's opinion contained the implicit declaration
of neutrality between religion and nonreligion, holding that a property tax exemption
for religious organizations with properties used for religious purposes does not violate
the Establishment Clause.44 In Walz, neutrality principles were not violated by allowing
the state to treat a religious organization the same as a nonreligious organization. The
next year, the Court enunciated the Lemon test,45 by which most Establishment Clause
challenges have been examined since.46 The second prong of the Lemon test-that
government action must not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion-has
been the primary point of contention in recent Establishment Clause challenges to
funding schemes. These funding cases shed significant light on the Court's use of the
neutrality principle.47
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Court consistently upheld the extension of
benefits-through religious exemptions4 8 or equal access49-to religiously affiliated
40. Professor Conkle attributes this move toward equality between denominations, in part,
to the Civil Rights Movement and the inability of the Court to overtly favor Christianity as it
had in the past. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 6.
41. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,409 (1963) ("[T]he extension of unemployment
benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences ...
42. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
43. Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 678-79.
45. The challenged statute or practice must "[f]irst have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statue must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."'
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971) (citation omitted) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at
668).
46. The Lemon test was modified inAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), in which the
Court stated it would continue to evaluate both the first and second prongs, but would no longer
consider the entanglement prong apart from the effect prong. Conkle, supra note 6, at 4. Though
some justices criticize the Lemon test as outdated, the Court used the Lemon test to invalidate
prayer at a high school football game in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290 (2000). See id.
47. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2000), the last funding case before Davey.
48. Exemptions are given to religious adherents as a form of government accommodation of
those religious adherents' beliefs. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding
2006]
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organizations or individuals who used the benefit for religious purposes, as long as the
benefit was distributed on a neutral, nondiscriminatory basis.50 In Rosenberger v.
University of Virginia,5 1 the Court held that the University of Virginia had opened a
limited forum for funding student publications and therefore could not discriminate
based on viewpoints expressed within that forum, as the University had done in
excluding a religious publication from the money made available to other
publications.5 2 The fund was open to student publications that met a set of neutral
criteria, save one: the publication could not "primarily promote[] or manifest[] a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality. '5 3 In invalidating the
funding scheme, the Court stated that such an exclusion compromised "[t]he neutrality
commanded of the State by the separate Clauses of the First Amendment... and would
risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very
neutrality the Establishment Clause requires. 5 4
The Court followed the same rationale in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School.55 A religious group was denied access to school property for after-school
activities because the group was religious and wanted to use the forum for activity that
was "the equivalent of religious worship."5 6 The Court cited Rosenberger as authority
for maintaining a stance of neutrality, striking the school's exclusion of religious
groups from the benefit of access to the forum.5 7 Both Rosenberger and Good News
Club are evidence of the increasing weight the Court began to give the neutrality
principle when referencing the Establishment Clause in Free Speech cases. Though the
Establishment Clause was not the basis of the holdings in either case-the holdings
were based on the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment-the Court in both
cases referred to the neutrality principles embodied in the Establishment Clause as part
that the State was compelled to grant a religious adherent an exemption from denial of
unemployment compensation when that person had lost herjob due to choosing to conform with
her religious practices instead of the requirements of the job).
49. Equal access is a function of the First Amendment Free Speech right in which the
government generally may not deny access to a speaker based on the speaker's viewpoint. See
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
50. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that remedial education
provided by publicly funded teachers could be extended to parochial schools without violating
the Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding
that the Establishment Clause was not violated by providing publicly funded sign-language
interpreters to deaf students at parochial schools); Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (holding that extension of a scholarship to one pursuing a theology
degree does not violate the Establishment Clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
(upholding tax deductions for parents of children in public and sectarian schools alike).
51. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
52. Id. at 837.
53. Id. at 822-23 (third alteration in original).
54. Id. at 845-46.
55. 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that the exclusion of the religious group from the public
forum was viewpoint discrimination and thus, unconstitutional).
56. Id. at 103.
57. Id. at 114.
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of its rationale:58 "[A] significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the
face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion."
59
The last funding case before Davey, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,60 emphasized the
availability of "true private choice" in extending nondiscriminatory benefits.6 1 Zelman
involved a voucher system established by the city of Cleveland, Ohio to provide
financial grants for inner-city children to attend secular private schools, sectarian
private schools, or public schools in adjacent school districts. 62 The money was given
to the students' parents, who then could decide where to send their student with the
tuition assistance.63 Again, the Court held, as it did in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest,64
that the Ohio program "is neutral in all respects toward religion[,] . . . confers
educational assistance to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to
religion[, and] ... permits the participation of all schools within the district, religious
or nonreligious."6 5 Therefore, "[t]here are no 'financial incentives' that 'skew' the
program toward religious schools."6 Because the program was distributed generally
and on a neutral basis and did not favor or disfavor religion, it did not violate the
Establishment Clause.67 The principle of neutrality operated in Zelman to uphold the
extension of benefits to students choosing to attend religious schools, treating those
students the same as students choosing to attend nonreligious schools.
All of these cases utilized the neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause to
uphold the extension of benefits to religious groups and individuals. Prior to Davey, it
appeared that inherent in the neutrality policy is the inclusion of religious groups when
the benefit is made generally available to all others. Neutrality is not neutral if it is used
only to uphold extensions of benefits, but not used to require that same extension
absent a compelling justification by the state. However, the Court has never held that a
state is compelled to include religious groups in generally available benefits aside from
cases involving equal access rights through the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.6 s
58. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
59. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (emphasis added).
60. 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that extension of voucher system to sectarian schools
does not violate the Establishment Clause despite the lack of a requirement to only use the
money for purely secular purposes).
61. Id. at 649.
62. Id. at 644-45.
63. Id.
64. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
65. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487-88
(1986)).
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that excluding religious
groups from using the university facilities for prayer and religious discussions is a denial of the
Free Speech principle of equal access and is also viewpoint discrimination, but inclusion of the
group does not violate the Establishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel v. Cent. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that the exclusion of an evangelical organization's film
series, based on a Christian perspective, at a school open after hours for social, civic, and
recreational purposes violates Free Speech rights of equal access and is viewpoint
discrimination, but inclusion of the group does not violate the Establishment Clause).
2006]
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D. The Differences Between Formal Neutrality and Substantive Neutrality
It is important to distinguish between the two degrees of neutrality the Court has and
may continue to pursue through the Establishment Clause. Formal neutrality, as coined
by Professor Douglas Laycock,69 calls for the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
"[to be] read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a
standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be,
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden.70 Formal neutrality, therefore, proscribes facial discrimination against or in
favor of a particular sect of religion or of religion in general. 71 An example of such
discrimination was found in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,72
where the city had enacted a statute that singled out the Santeria church for disfavored
treatment. The statute was invalidated on Free Exercise grounds because the
discriminatory treatment precluded the Santeria adherents from exercising the practices
of their religion.73 The Court likened its neutrality mandate to that of its past
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: "In our Establishment Clause cases we have often
stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove
of a particular religion or of religion in general." 74 Thus, the Court used formal
neutrality as a justification for invalidation under the Free Exercise Clause, but it did so
under the auspices of the Establishment Clause.
Professor Douglas Laycock, nevertheless, finds formal neutrality inadequate to
protect religious liberty. Instead, he advocates "substantive neutrality," which compels
the government to "minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages
religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance."
75
Substantive neutrality goes one step further than formal neutrality: it requires
government practice to avoid the effect of disparate treatment.76 Under the substantive
neutrality principle, akin to the second prong of the Lemon test, the government may
not act in a way that has the effect of advancing or burdening religion.77 This approach
69. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAuL L. REv. 993, 999 (1990).
70. See id. (quoting Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
C. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961)).
71. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 9.
72. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
73. Id. The statute in Lukumi purposefully discriminated against the religious adherents,
unlike the landmark Free Exercise case of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
in which the Court denied a Free Exercise exemption for religious use of peyote. The use of
peyote was a criminal offense under a neutral, generally applicable state statute, for which a
state is not compelled to grant an exemption to a religious adherent to practice his religion. See
id. at 886.
74. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532. This is akin to the first prong of the Lemon test. See supra
note 45.
75. Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 8, at 1001; see also Conkle, supra
note 8, at 9.
76. See Conkle, supra note 8, at 9.
77. Id.
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requires a court to look past the face of the statute or regulation, into its result.78
Professor Daniel 0. Conkle contends that substantive neutrality is not neutral at all, but
rather, gives religion special treatment.79 Formal neutrality, he argues, is the "purest,
and is certainly the simplest, means of implementing a policy of equal treatment for
religion and nonreligion." ° Davey would easily win under a substantive neutrality
analysis because the State's denial of a scholarship had the effect of disparate treatment
against Davey since he had chosen to pursue a theology major. But to avoid any special
treatment of religion, this Note argues that the Court in Davey should have evaluated
Davey's claim under the formal neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause.8' In
fact, the Court engaged in a substantive neutrality analysis under the Free Exercise
Clause-reasoning that Washington's policy had no effect on Davey's ability to
practice his religion.82 But the Court did not need to delve that deeply into the effect of
the State's policy to find it a violation of the Establishment Clause under formal
neutrality analysis. The Promise Scholarship criteria was written "in terms of religion
either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden," which formal neutrality prohibits. 83
The Court has before engaged in formal neutrality analyses for its Establishment
Clause cases that also implicated the Free Speech equal access principles,84 and it is
only proper that the Court continues to do so even if it does not find a valid Free
Speech claim.
8 5
78. One could argue that the Court in Lukumi actually engaged in substantive neutrality in
looking for an animus toward religion because the words used to exclude the Santeria religion
were ambiguous as to whether they were used in a secular or religious way. "To determine the
object of a law, we must begin with its text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a
law not discriminate on its face. . . . [But] 'the Court must survey meticulously the
circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate... religious gerrymanders."' Lukumi,
508 U.S. at 533-34 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
79. Conkle, supra note 8, at 10. Earlier in Professor Conkle's article, he discusses the
history of Christianity in the Court's jurisprudence as being "distinct and distinctly important"
before the Court moved to a doctrine of neutrality. See id. at 3-5. Perhaps formal neutrality is a
way to avoid favoring religion, without excluding religion, as the State of Washington did in
Davey.
80. Id.
81. All arguments for requiring the states to adhere to neutrality principles hereinafter will
be in reference only to formal neutrality.
82. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004).
83. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
84. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Cent. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
85. Davey did raise a Free Speech claim, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied
heavily on this claim in holding the Washington Promise Scholarship unconstitutional. See
Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court of the United States
dismissed Davey's Free Speech claim in a footnote. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 721 n.3.
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II. LocKE v. DA VEY: ABANDONING NEUTRALITY
"From the perspective of the Court's cases on discrimination against religion,
[Davey] is remarkable. The Court had never before held that the state can discriminate
against religion."8 6 Along with narrowing the holding of Lukumi, refusing to review
state action that negatively affected a religious adherent under strict scrutiny, and
allowing a state to exclude a religious adherent from a generally available benefit, the
Court substantially deviated from the neutrality principles in the Establishment Clause.
Davey was decided as a Free Exercise case, but this Note argues that the Court should
have more closely evaluated the Establishment Clause implications when it declared
that Davey fell within the "play in the joints" between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses.
A. Washington 's Constitution and Promise Scholarship Program
The Washington State legislature created the Promise Scholarship Program in 1999
to assist low-income but academically gifted students in attending college.8 7 A
recipient could use the scholarship money for only two years of college, but the money
could be used for any education-related expenses at a nationally accredited
postsecondary institution, including religiously affiliated institutions.8 At the time the
Davey lawsuit was first filed, a prospective scholarship recipient had to meet the
following criteria to receive the scholarship: (1) graduate from a Washington public or
private high school; (2) graduate in the top 15% of a 2000 graduating class or in the
top 10% of a 1999 graduating class; (3) have a family income that is less than 135% of
the State's median; and (4) enroll, at least part-time, in a post-secondary educational
institution in the State of Washington.8 9 The final and non-neutral criterion that a
scholarship recipient must meet is that he may not pursue a degree in theology.90 While
each institution decides which of its available degrees are "theology" degrees, 9' the
definition used in Davey was a degree that is "devotional in nature or designed to
induce religious faith. 92 Neither party disputed this definition.
The State of Washington excluded theology degrees from the scholarship program
to avoid forcing its citizens to violate their "freedom of conscience," as provided by the
86. Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 171.
87. Davey, 540 U.S. at 715-16.
88. Id. at 716.
89. Id. The scholarship has since been altered with an additional requirement: the student
must attain, on the first attempt, a cumulative Scholastic Achievement Test I score of 1200 or
higher or a score of 27 or higher on the American College Test. Update on state funding of
Promise Scholarship, Washington Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., http://www.hecb.wa.gov/
financialaid/wps/wpsindex.asp (last visited January 18, 2006). See also Carlos S. Montoya,
Constitutional Development: Locke v. Davey and the "Play in the Joints " Between the Religion
Clauses, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1159, 1160 n.8 (2004).
90. Id.; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12Xf)-(g) (2000). See also WASH. REv. CODE §
28B.10.814 (2002).
91. Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
92. Id. at 716.
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Washington Constitution.93 The pertinent provision of the Washington Constitution is
as follows:
Religious Freedom. Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious
sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one
shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the
liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the
state. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment .... 94
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, the attorney for Washington in Davey
argued that the state's taxpayers' freedom of conscience would be violated if the
scholarship money, taken from general tax funds, was extended to the education of
future clergymen.95 The money could be used at any sectarian school in the state, even
by a student taking numerous religious courses, but if the student declared a theology
major, the scholarship was denied to them based on the aims of the constitutional
provision quoted above. 96 Washington's constitutional anti-establishment provision is
more restrictive than that of the Federal Constitution in recognizing the State's
citizens' "freedom of conscience," a right not found in the Federal Establishment
Clause. A state is free to impose greater restrictions than the Federal Constitution
requires, as long as it does not abridge a Federal Constitutional right by doing so.
97
This Note argues that the Promise Scholarship does abridge a Federal Constitutional
right: the right to neutrality.
98
Joshua Davey applied for and received the Promise Scholarship in 1999.99 He chose
to attend Northwest College, a Christian college affiliated with the Assembly of God
denomination and dedicated to a pervasively Christian higher education. 00 Upon
93. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315) (Dec. 2,
2003) (statement by Narda Pierce, counsel for petitioner).
94. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
95. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 93, at 17-18 (statement by Narda Pierce,
counsel for petitioner).
96. See id. at 22-23.
97. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); see A Federalist View, supra note 18, at
1715-16.
98. See discussion infra, Parts II.C.-III.
99. Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
100. Id. Northwest College, now named Northwest University, is located in Kirkland,
Washington. Its mission statement reads, "The mission of Northwest University is to provide, in
a distinctly evangelical Christian environment, quality education to prepare students for service
and leadership." About the University, Northwest University Web page,
http://www.northwestu.edu/about/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (emphasis added). Furthermore,
all students at Northwest College are required to attend chapel, a time "to know God; to have
fellowship within the body; and to reach the world," three times a week. Chapel Introduction,
Northwest University Web page, http://www.northwestu.edu/ministry/chapel/index.php (last
visited Jan. 22, 2005). This required class for every student at Northwest College teaches the
same principles and doctrines that a pastoral studies major would take in pursuit of a "theology"
degree. There seems to be no distinction between violating the Washington taxpayers' freedom
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entering Northwest College, Davey declared a double major in business administration
and pastoral ministries and was subsequently informed that he could not use his
scholarship due to his chosen major of "theology."'' 1 He refused to change his major
and filed an action in the District Court for the Western District of Washington against
Washington State officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,102 seeking to enjoin the State from
denying him the scholarship based on his pursuit of a theology degree.' 0 3 The district
court granted summary judgment to the State, rejecting Davey's constitutional
claims. 1°4 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
Washington scholarship singled out religion for disfavored treatment and that its
discrimination did not survive the requisite strict scrutiny because the State's anti-
establishment defense is not a compelling interest and therefore a violation of Davey's
Free Exercise rights. 10 5 The Ninth Circuit also gave weight to Davey's Free Speech
claim, recognizing the viewpoint discrimination by the State.'0 6 On writ of certiorari,
the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the State's policy did not
violate Davey's Free Exercise rights.
B. The Majority's Rationale Behind Davey
Eighteen years after the Supreme Court held in Witters v. Washington Department.
of Services for the Blind'0 7 that Washington could extend a generally available
scholarship to a student pursuing a theology degree without violating the Establishment
Clause, a principle recently confirmed in Zelman,10 8 a large majority of the Davey
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution does not compel
Washington to include theology majors in the benefit made generally available to
others. 10 9 The Court declared that Davey involved the "play in the joints" between the
of conscience by contributing funds to allow a student to attend Northwest College where he
will be required to attend chapel three times a week and contributing funds to a student who will
take similar classes, but in pursuit of a certain degree. The incongruence of that which
Washington is opposed to funding and what it readily funds is outside the scope of this Note,
but it is an important fact to consider and another justification for protecting Davey's right to
receive the scholarship benefit.
101. Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) is the statute under which a citizen may sue state officials for
infringing upon a federal constitutional right.
103. Davey, 540 U.S. at 718.
104. Id. Davey's constitutional claims in district court were violations of, inter alia, the Free
Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment, as incorporated by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
105. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit cited Church of
the LukumiBabalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520(1993), as authority for invoking strict
scrutiny for a statute that was discriminatory on its face toward religion, thus violating the Free
Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution.
106. Davey, 299 F.3d at 755-56.
107. 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986) (holding that extension of a scholarship to one pursuing a
theology degree does not violate the Establishment Clause).
108. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
109. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 719. The Court granted certiorari on the question of "whether
Washington, pursuant to its own constitution, which has been authoritatively interpreted as
prohibiting even indirectly funding religious instruction that will prepare students for the
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Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the state to have discretion in
funding decisions."10 The Court rejected Davey's reliance onLukumi,"'l reasoning that
there must be evidence of an animus toward religion before strict scrutiny will apply to
a statute that is facially discriminatory." 2 Furthermore, according to the Court, the
denial of a scholarship to Davey to pursue a theology degree does not preclude him
from exercising his religious beliefs and practices; 113 the alleged discrimination was
merely the State's choice of what to fund and what not to fund, a choice it is entitled to
make. 114 The Court also cited historical uprisings opposing the appropriation of funds
to the education of clergy as further justification for Washington's policy of excepting
the clergy from its generally available benefit."'
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, contends that Davey
should be controlled by Lukumi because a religious adherent has been burdened by
ministry, can deny them such funding without violating the Free Exercise Clause." Id. (citations
omitted).
110. Id. This concept was first introduced in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664
(1970), which upheld a state's practice of extending a benefit to a religious group. The Court
stated that this "play in the joints" is an area in which the state may choose to extend a generally
available benefit without offending the Establishment Clause. See id. at 669,678-79; supra text
accompanying notes 42-44.
111. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
112. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 720. "That a State would deal differently with religious
education for the ministry than with education for other callings is... not evidence of hostility
toward religion." Id. at 721. Since Davey was a funding case, the requirement for an animus
toward religion could apply only to funding cases, depending on how narrowly or broadly one
reads the Court's opinion.
113. Id. at 720. The Court found Davey's situation to be unlike that in Lukumi, where the
Santeria adherents were precluded from making animal sacrifices, an important part of their
religious practices. The Santeria adherents were singled out as the only religious sect to be
precluded from sacrificial activity, as there were exceptions for Jews and other sacrificial events.
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534-35. One could argue that, in fact, Davey was precluded from
practicing his religion, as many evangelical pastors feel it is their "calling" from God to go into
the ministry, and if Davey was not financially able to attend college without the scholarship, the
purpose for which the scholarship was serving, it is not too difficult to find that he has been
precluded from the exercise of his religious beliefs. Nevertheless, the Court has maintained in
the past that it is not a violation of one's Free Exercise right to make religious practices more
expensive except in cases involving unemployment compensation. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the State could not deny a religious adherent unemployment
compensation when that person had lost her job after choosing to conform with her religious
practices instead of the requirements of the job). Cf United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
(holding that an Amish man could not refuse, through religious objection, to pay social security
taxes for his employees); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (holding Sunday closing
laws constitutional despite the financial burden it placed on Saturday sabbatarians, whose
religious practices compelled them to close on Saturdays as well, thus losing revenues for two
days as opposed to Sunday sabbatarians who only closed one day).
114. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 720-21.
115. See id. at 723 n.6 (citing colonial Virginia's "A Bill Establishing A Provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion," reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 74
(1947), and the public outcry that ensued resulting in Virginia's Bill for Religious Liberty); see
also supra, Part I.A.
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facially discriminatory state action." 6 Davey merely wants to be treated the same as all
other Promise Scholarship applicants that meet the neutral criteria. According to
Justice Scalia, Washington has created a "public welfare" program made generally
available to everyone except those defined by their religious beliefs and practices. 1
7
He likens this burden on religious adherents to a special tax that would be assessed
only to those who pursue theology degrees, since they are arguably paying more for
college than they would had they chosen not to pursue a theology degree."' Such a
special tax has the effect of burdening individuals who choose to pursue religious
careers. Conversely, the majority references taxes used to support the clergy in colonial
times as justification for denying Davey the scholarship."l 9 The historical taxes that the
majority uses in its rationale were actually taxes assessed specifically and solely to
fund the clergy; 120 the monies that flowed to the clergy were not taken from a general
tax for which the clergy was one of the beneficiaries. The funding scheme used in
colonial times to support the clergy is wholly different from the funding scheme of the
Promise Scholarship, which does derive from a general fund. Therefore, the Court's
reliance on the historical outcry against funding for the clergy is misplaced and
unrelated to the Promise Scholarship.
121
C. The Court's Departure from Neutrality
1. The Changed Role of History in Religion Clause Jurisprudence
History has never been a controlling legal force. The Constitution was written
broadly so that it could be interpreted in different ways as become necessary with
changes in society, but some doctrines require the Court to consider history to discern
the intent of the writers of the Constitution. In Lynch v. Donnelly,122 Chief Justice
Burger emphasized the importance of history in Establishment Clause cases, stating
that the Court has "refused 'to construe the Religion Clauses with a literalness that
would undermine the ultimate constitutional objective as illuminated by history."1 23
The Lynch Court traced the historical presence of Christianity in American life through
holidays such as Thanksgiving and Christmas, art found in the National Gallery, and
use of prayer and references to God in governmental exercises and legislative sessions,
as well as references to God on currency, in the Pledge, and in the national motto, to
116. See Davey, at 726-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 726-27 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
118. See id.
119. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
120. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819, 853
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the dissent's citation to the Virginia tax
assessed specifically to fund the clergy as justification for not supporting a religious publication
in a forum opened to all other publications).
121. Justice Scalia discussed this discrepancy as one of his reasons for dissenting. See
Davey, 540 U.S. at 727-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that the display of a cr che in a public display was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause despite its pervasively Christian nature).
123. Id. at 678 (emphasis in original) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671
(1970)).
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support its holding that a nativity scene displayed by the city was not an infringement
of the Establishment Clause.
24
Most recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist invoked history to support his concurrence
in Elk Grove Un ifed School District v. Newdow, 125 stating that the words "under God"
in the Pledge of Allegiance did not violate the Establishment Clause because of the
pervasive history of God in American culture. 126 When a four-member group of the
Court is known for "voting for... religion more than they [are] interpreting liberty"'
127
in discriminatory funding cases because of the history of religion in American culture,
the large majority garnered against religion in Davey is quite surprising.' 28
The majority opinion of Davey, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, departs from the
Court's customary use of history in past Religion Clause challenges. The Court,
especially Chief Justice Rehnquist, typically used the history of Judeo-Christian
thought in the United States-beginning with the original colonies and continuing to
the present, in which an overwhelming majority of Americans believe in God12 9-to
uphold equal, if not preferential, treatment for religious adherents in its Religion
Clause jurisprudence. 30 Thus, for the modem Court to use the historical uprisings
against a tax allocated specifically for the clergy, though not directly analogous to
Davey,131 to deny religious adherents even equal treatment is almost an aberration.
2. The Requirement of an Animus Toward Religion to Prove Facial Discrimination
In Davey the Court narrowed the holding of Lukumi, stating that despite the
discrimination on the face of the statute against theology majors, an animus toward
theology majors must be shown before the statute would be construed as presumptively
unconstitutional and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.132 Depending on one's reading
of the scope of the holding, animus may only be required in funding cases. 133 But the
Court, in both Lukumi and Davey, seemed to be more concerned with the effect of the
discriminatory treatment than the motivation behind it. In Lukumi, the Santeria
adherents faced criminal sanctions, which seems to be the "animus" the Court was
124. Id. at 674-77.
125. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
126. Id. at 26-29 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (referring to numerous other instances of
God's placement in our culture: Washington's first inaugural address; the yearly Thanksgiving
proclamation; "In God We Trust" as the national motto and on every piece of coinage; the
Supreme Court Marshal's opening proclamation, "God save the United States and this
honorable Court"; and the national anthem).
127. Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 175 (discussing the usually consistent
voting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas in favor of
religion, as seen in Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)).
128. The Davey majority garnered seven votes, with only Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissenting. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 712 (2004).
129. Michael Newdow, David vs. Goliath (Oct. 12, 2003), in FREETHOUGHT TODAY
(Freedom From Religion Found. Inc., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2003 (an atheist stating that
ninety-three percent of Americans believe in God).
130. See discussion infra Part II.C. 1.
131. See discussion supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
132. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
133. See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 161-62.
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looking for in Davey.134 Moreover, the Court in Davey examined the purpose for
including the heightened anti-establishment provision in state constitutions, 135 an
inquiry into legislative motive in which Chief Justice Rehnquist did not join in
Lukumi. 36 In fact, there was not even a majority of the Court that joined in the part of
the Lukumi opinion that used legislative records to determine whether there was an
animosity toward the Santeria adherents.'
37
Though the Court in Davey did not use legislative records, it did use the history of
States' anti-establishment provisions to find the purpose of such provisions.
Furthermore, it rejected and declined to comment on the plausibility of Washington's
anti-establishment clause as a "Blaine Amendment," driven by discrimination,
dismissing the issue in a footnote.' 38 Many state "Blaine Amendments" were anti-
establishment provisions that excluded religious institutions and organizations from
public funding, motivated by Protestant leaders who were outraged at public funding
that flowed to Catholic schools.139 In the mid- 1 800s, Catholics had formed their own
schools to escape the pervasive Protestant culture taught in the public classroom. 1
40
When the first Blaine Amendment, proposed as an amendment to the Federal
Constitution, failed in Congress, more than half of the states enacted similar
amendments for their respective state constitutions to keep from funding the Catholic
schools.141 The State of Washington contended that its anti-establishment provision,
Section Eleven of the Washington Constitution, is not a "Blaine Amendment," and
Davey did not dispute this.142 The question remains whether the Court would construe
evidence that Washington's anti-establishment provision was motivated by anti-
Catholic animus as sufficient to invalidate the provision under Lukumi. 143
134. See id. "In the present case, the State's disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of
a far milder kind [than in Lukumi]. It imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of
religions service or rite." Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
135. Davey, 540 U.S. at 722-24. Although the Court did not look into the specific history of
the Washington constitutional provision, it explored the reasons for inclusion of such a
provision in various other states as justification for Washington's provision.
136. Instead, the Chief Justice joined in Justice Scalia's concurrence-in part and concurrence
in the judgment, which explicitly repudiated the inquiry into legislative motive for the facial
discrimination against the Santeria adherents. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 558-59 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that inquiry into the purpose of a law
that affects a First Amendment right is rarely appropriate because the appropriate inquiry is into
the effect of the law on one's First Amendment rights). "[The First Amendment] does not put us
in the business of invalidating laws by reason of the evil motives of their authors." Id. at 558.
137. Part II.A.2 of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lukumi was joined only by Justice Stevens.
138. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7.
139. See Slater, supra note 30, at 586-92.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7.
143. See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 187-91 (arguing that a claim
similar to Davey's could win by establishing bad motive through a "Blaine Amendment").
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3. The "Play in the Joints"
The Court characterizes Davey as a case in which there is a "play in the joints"
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 44 This occurs when
the Establishment Clause does not forbid the state from extending benefits to religious
adherents and organizations, 145 and the Free Exercise Clause, alternatively, does not
compel an extension, thus conferring discretion upon the state. 14 6 In past funding cases
that fell into this chasm between the two Religion Clauses, the Free Speech Clause was
also implicated. Through the Free Speech Clause, the Court protected the religious
adherent's equal access in exercising his religious right, ensuring that he received the
benefit that was available to all others. 147 Though the Supreme Court dismissed
Davey's Free Speech claim, 14 the principles set forth in the Court's Free Speech cases
that protected religious equality and liberty should be maintained in Davey, even
absent a valid Free Speech claim.149 The Establishment Clause alone protects these
rights-religious liberty and equality. 150 The scholarship money made available to the
Washington high school students that met the neutral criteria' 5' is arguably the same
type of funding forum opened in Rosenberger for the publication of student
magazines. 5 2 Forum analysis is usually reserved for Free Speech challenges, but there
144. Davey, 540 U.S. at 719.
145. Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
146. See Davey, 540 U.S. 719.
147. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that a religious
publication had an equal access right to printing funds that were generally available to all other
publications that met the neutral criteria because the school had opened the fund as a forum in
which it could not engage in viewpoint discrimination); Lamb's Chapel v. Cent. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that an evangelical organization had an
equal access right to show its film series that presented a topic from a Christian point of view at
a school open after hours for social, civic, and recreational purposes, which was a limited forum
in which the school could not engage in viewpoint discrimination); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a religious group had an equal access right to use university
facilities that were open to all other groups in a limited forum in which the university could not
engage in viewpoint discrimination). In an interesting article, Professor Conkle assesses the
redundancy of the Free Exercise Clause in that the rights that are protected by it are already
protected by Free Speech principles. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Free Exercise Clause: How
Redundant, and Why?, 33 Loy. U. C. L.J. 95 (2001) (arguing that perhaps Free Speech
protections already ensure the rights of the Free Exercise Clause). If this is true, Rosenberger
(upholding a free exercise challenge in a funding forum) and Davey (rejecting a free exercise
challenge in a funding forum) are inconsistent.
148. Davey, 540 U.S. at 721. The Ninth Circuit relied, in part, on Davey's Free Speech claim
in its decision that held the Washington Promise Scholarship unconstitutional. See Davey v.
Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 755-56 (9th Cir. 2002).
149. See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 191-96 for an interesting
discussion of a college as a forum for speech within which the Promise Scholarship could not
discriminate because of Free Speech principles.
150. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
151. The neutral criteria for the Promise Scholarship are academic achievement, income
level, and enrollment criteria (enrolled at least half time at a nationally accredited school in the
state of Washington). Davey, 540 U.S. at 716.
152. Professor Laycock asserts that the Court would not even need to engage in a forum
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is no logical reason that Davey should not be protected in the same type of funding
situation as the religious adherents were in Rosenberger only because the Court sees no
merit in Davey's hybrid Free Speech right.15 3 The student magazines in Rosenberger
had to meet neutral criteria before they could be considered for funding.15 4 Before the
Court invalidated the school's policy, the school excluded all religious magazines from
funding, the sole exclusion to the funding, much like the Promise Scholarship, and this
is precisely what the Court struck down in Rosenberger. 55 The Court should have
afforded Davey the same protection of religious liberty and equality, 156 and it could
have done so by more fully considering the implications the Establishment Clause had
on Davey's claim. In cases that fall into the "play in the joints," the Court should fully
consider both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses to afford the claimant all
protections available in both clauses.
The State of Washington argued that it has the discretion to choose what to fund and
what not to fund because of the "play in the joints" between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, 157 a choice which the State typically enjoys. 58 But, as
Professor Laycock explains, funding that includes religious organizations or religious
adherents is different from all other funding because of the Establishment Clause.
Since the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has maintained a principle of
neutrality, a state must appropriate funds on a neutral basis if the benefit is available
upon otherwise neutral criteria.' 59 Because Davey fell in between the two Religion
Clauses, the "play in the joints," the neutrality protections of the Establishment Clause
should have had some force in the Court's decision to allow the State full discretion in
funding.
analysis because viewpoint discrimination, present in Davey through exclusion only of theology
majors, is presumptively unconstitutional regardless of a forum of any kind. Laycock, Theology
Scholarships, supra note 8, at 192 (citation omitted).
153. I borrow the term "hybrid" from Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990), referring to the need for two constitutional rights to receive an
exemption from a generally applicable law. Justice Scalia, the author of Smith, obviously does
not want to extend the hybrid right requirement to a situation like Davey's since he wrote one of
the dissenting opinions to the denial of Davey's claim.
154. The student group that would maintain the magazine had to have a majority
membership of students, had to have managing officers who were full-time students, could not
discriminate in its membership, and had to place a disclaimer on all correspondence with third
parties that the organization was independent of the university. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 823 (1995).
155. See discussion supra Part I.C.
156. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of neutrality principles
maintained by the Court in Rosenberger.
157. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 93 at 26-27 (statement by Narda Pierce,
counsel for petitioner).
158. The Court in Rosenberger recognized this right of the State. "'[W]hen the government
appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that
program."' Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 892 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). But the Court rejected the State's discretionary power because the choice
not to fund was based on viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 845 (majority opinion).
159. See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 175-184.
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The Supreme Court upheld state discretionary funding as a permissible choice of the
state to "fund one activity to the exclusion of the other"'160 in Rust v. Sullivan, a
viewpoint discrimination challenge to a government policy of appropriating funds to
doctors who told their patients about contraception, but not about abortion.,
61
Similarly, the Court upheld a government decision to appropriate funds to Medicaid
programs for childbirth, but not for abortions. 62 Professor Laycock contends that the
Court's justification in Davey that "[tihe State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct
category of instruction" 163 was taken from these discretionary funding cases involving
abortion. 64 But when the Court declared in Everson that a state could not exclude
religious adherents "from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation,"' 65 it
extended the reach of the Establishment Clause to include funding. Therefore, the
neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause also is extended to funding schemes
that implicate religious adherents. Unlike funding for childbirth and abortions, the
Court should require a state to maintain a position of neutrality toward religious
adherents when extending a generally available benefit; it may not exclude the
religious on the basis of their religious convictions as a state may do in excluding
social services that it does not wish to endorse, such as abortion. 66
The Court began its Establishment Clause jurisprudence with the principle of
neutrality in Everson, but the Rehnquist Court formalized that neutrality principle and
made it an essential part of its Religion Clause inquiries, culminating with Zelman.
67
Though the Court addressed Davey as a Free Exercise claim, the Establishment Clause
principle of neutrality should have had more force in the "play in the joints" between
the two clauses, rendering Washington's discriminatory funding unconstitutional. The
Court dismissed any Establishment Clause violation in a footnote, stating that the
reasons to dismiss under the Establishment Clause were the same as they had discussed
in dismissing the free exercise claim. 168 While the State may be correct that Davey's
rights to freedom of action and belief under the Free Exercise Clause are not burdened
160. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (holding that such discretionary funding was not viewpoint
discrimination). See also Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 175.
161. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194; Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 175.
162. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
163. Davey, 540 U.S. at 721.
164. Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 176.
165. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
166. See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 176-77. Professor Laycock also
cites the endorsement test as justification for this argument. The state may not "'endorse or
disapprove of religion."' Id. at 177 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). The second prong of the Lemon test also conveys a principle of
neutrality: "[the statute's] principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
167. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding vouchers distributed to
students, which could be used at sectarian private schools without any requirements that the
funds be used for secular aspects of education). See also supra Part I.C-D. Part I.D provides a
comparison of formal neutrality and substantive neutrality.
168. Davey, 540 U.S. at 725 n.10 ("Although we have sometimes characterized the
Establishment Clause as prohibiting the State from 'disproving of a particular religion or
religion in general' ... the State has not impermissibly done so here." (citations omitted)). See
also supra Part II.A. for a discussion of the Washington Constitution.
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by the denial of the scholarship,' 69 that justification does not change the discriminating
nature of the scholarship on the basis of religion, which is an infringement of the
Establishment Clause.
The new Chief Justice of the Court, John G. Roberts, gave little indication as to his
views on the Religion Clauses in his confirmation hearings, and he has not published
any judicial opinions or legal scholarship on the subject. He did state in day two of the
confirmation hearings that, in his opinion, "the animating principle of the framers,
that's reflected in both of the religion clauses, is that no one should be denied the rights
of full citizenship because of their religious belief or their lack of religious belief.' 170
And though he "[hasn't] expressed [his] personal views on the establishment clause in
any context," he believes that the framers of the constitution did not "[intend] just to
have a protection for denominational discrimination" in protecting the citizens'
exercise, or non-exercise, of religion.' 71 Whether Chief Justice Roberts would ascribe
to formal neutrality between religion and nonreligion remains to be seen, but an amicus
brief he collaboratively wrote while serving as Solicitor General is somewhat
revealing.172 Though it is a brief written to advocate the position of the government,
Solicitor General Roberts made the same connection between the Establishment Clause
and forum analysis, as equal protectors of equal treatment without regard to religion-
neutrality.'73
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE REVISITED
Justice Black declared in Everson14 that the Establishment Clause applied to the
states, thus beginning the formal incorporation of the Establishment Clause. 75 The
Court has used the incorporation precedent from Everson to validate religious
accommodation by the states and extension of benefits that do not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause. 76 In certain contexts, the Court has declared that the Free
Exercise Clause compels a state to accommodate religion to prevent a religious
adherent from choosing between his religion and following the regulation. 177 The
compulsory state accommodation was partly restricted in Employment Division v.
Smith,178 but the State can nevertheless choose to accommodate the religious adherent
169. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
170. John G. Roberts Confirmation to the Supreme Court: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Committee (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05257/571043.stm
(last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (statement of John G. Roberts).
171. Id.
172. Brief for the United States as Appellant, Rd. ofEduc. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(No. 88-1597), 1989 WL 1127408.
173. See id. at 30-36.
174. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 n.21 (1947).
175. Id. at 14-15; see supra Part I.B.
176. See discussion supra Parts I.B-C and accompanying notes.
177. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the State was
compelled to grant a religious adherent an exemption from denial of unemployment
compensation when that person had lost her job due to choosing to conform with her religious
practices instead of the requirements of the job). Some argue this compulsory accommodation is
only required in the unemployment compensation context.
178. 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (requiring the existence of a hybrid constitutional right to
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to relieve him of a burden from a generally applicable law. 179 When a religious
adherent is not protected by the Free Exercise Clause (or Free Speech principles), the
Court refers to the "play in the joints" between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause that allows a state discretion on how to pursue the matter. This
"play in the joints" has now, after Davey, left the religious adherent with no recourse:
he is no longer afforded strict scrutiny when burdened by a facially discriminatory
statute unless an animus, which may need to rise to a penal level, toward his religion
can be shown,'8 0 nor are his religious convictions distinctly important to the Court as
they once were.18 ' In fact, religious convictions seem to have been relegated to a lower
status than ever before.
Never before has the Court held that the Establishment Clause compels a state to
ensure that religious adherents receive their share of generally available benefits, but
perhaps it should. The receipt of a benefit is different from the relief from a burden.
This distinction is demonstrated in the difference between abortion funding schemes
(the right not to be unduly burdened by the government) and the inclusion of religion in
funding schemes (the right to religious liberty and equality and therefore neutrality).1 82
The Establishment Clause, as incorporated, should compel a State to extend the right to
neutrality in the receipt of generally available benefits as the Court has described the
neutrality principle in most of its major Religion Clauses cases. 8 3 By allowing a State
to exclude religious endeavors, the Court is not adhering to its self-proclaimed
Establishment Clause principles, thus giving a State more power than an incorporated
Establishment Clause allows. Such discretion runs afoul of incorporation principles
and does not adequately protect religious liberties.
A. Incorporation?
If the Court is going to give states the discretion to exclude religious pursuits from
otherwise generally available benefits, the Court should cease its position that the
Establishment Clause is incorporated. Before incorporation, a State had the discretion
to exclude religion, but incorporation made the protections of federal constitutional
rights applicable to the States.1 4 After incorporation, the States are no longer the
regulators of religious liberty and equality as they once were; the liberties exuded in
the Federal Constitution confer religious rights upon the citizenry.
As discussed previously in this Note, there is little historical support for
incorporating the Establishment Clause.' 8 5 The framers wanted to leave religious
liberty issues to the States and also wanted to prevent the establishment of a national
compel an exemption from a generally applicable law except in special situations such as
unemployment compensation and education, for which the Court carved out individual
exemptions).
179. See id.
180. But see supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining that an animus may only be
required in funding cases).
181. See supra note 79.
182. See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 177; supra notes 147-56 and
accompanying text.
183. See supra Parts I.C-D.
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. See supra Part I.B.
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church. 8 6 If the Establishment Clause were not incorporated, then Washington would
be able to exclude Davey from its scholarship program in the name of the State's
religious principles, which is precisely what it did in Davey. Absent incorporation,
Washington could protect its citizens' "freedom of conscience," as its constitution
provides, without infringing upon their religious rights because the State would have
the authority to regulate religious liberties. But, notwithstanding incorporation of the
Establishment Clause, the Court upheld Washington's exclusion.
Justice Thomas has argued that the Establishment Clause does not confer any
substantive rights because the clause is only a concept of federalism, "intended to
prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments."' 87 If the Establishment
Clause is only a concept of federalism, then incorporation is futile because it applies
the clause to both the federal and state governments, losing the federalism component.
Professor Daniel 0. Conlde contends that Chief Justice Rehnquist also wished to
maintain the federalism component in the Establishment Clause, encouraging the
discretion of state policymakers on religious liberties. 188 This goal of the Chief Justice
may explain his surprising vote in Davey to "give the states considerable leeway" in
religious matters. 189 But the discretion that Davey gave to the States to exclude
religious groups from otherwise generally available benefits is contrary to the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause.
B. Neutrality as a Federal Constitutional Right
If the Court is to respect its precedent and maintain that the Establishment Clause,
guided by the principles of neutrality, is incorporated, then it cannot use the
Establishment Clause to validate only extensions of benefits, as it did in Mueller,
Witters, Zobrest, Agostini, 19 and Zelman.' 91 Neutrality compels equal treatment of the
religious and nonreligious alike; it compels treatment without regard to religion.
92
Much like viewpoint discrimination, which is impermissible under Free Speech
principles, the federal government and the States should not be able to discriminate on
the basis of religion if the Establishment Clause is incorporated. The Court has never
declared that one has a "right" to neutrality, but the protection against favoring or
disfavoring religion is a foundation principle of the Establishment Clause.193 Perhaps
the Court should explicitly state the right inherent in the various Establishment Clause
tests-the right to neutrality.
186. See supra Part I.A-B.
187. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
188. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 23.
189. Id. at 20.
190. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947).
193. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[It]
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.") (emphasis added).
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The State of Washington chose not to follow the doctrine of neutrality, citing its
own state constitution as justification for excluding theology majors.194 If
Washington's state constitution allows it to violate the principle of neutrality, it is
violating the protections of the Federal Establishment Clause. A right to neutrality is
essential to the preservation of one's religious rights that fall into the "play in the
joints" divide between the Religion Clauses that the Court has not yet protected. 95
The Court seems to hesitate in requiring neutrality between religion and
nonreligion, which was at issue in Davey, but doubtfully would it be as hesitant to
require neutrality among religions. For example, it is doubtful that the Court would
vote as it did in Davey if the State had excluded only those students wishing to pursue
rabbinical school in the future, as opposed to all theology majors-Christians,
Muslims, and Jews alike. Such an exclusion would be disfavoring Jews and, therefore,
preferring one religion over another, a different abuse of Establishment Clause
doctrine. Counsel for the State of Washington conceded at oral argument that such a
discrimination among religions would be impermissible.' 96 The Court must require the
States to maintain neutrality among religious sects and between religion and
nonreligion to avoid discrimination in the name of religion, as Washington was
allowed to pursue through Davey.
If the Court is going to maintain a position of neutrality in its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, a religious adherent should have a right to that neutrality. Since the First
Amendment is incorporated, 97 a State may not infringe upon one's right to neutrality.
Even if its state constitution gives it the power to do so, a State may not limit a
person's federally protected constitutional rights. 98 If the Court would explicitly
recognize one's right to neutrality under the Establishment Clause, as opposed to
merely referring to it in Establishment Clause cases, Free Exercise cases, and Free
Speech cases alike, religious liberty would truly be able to flourish.
When the State of Washington chose to open its scholarship to private sectarian
schools, it no longer had the right to offer that benefit to all educational majors,
excluding only one, defined by religion. Washington could have limited the scholarship
to students that attended only public schools in furtherance of the state public school
system.199 Washington chose to interpret its constitution to allow the inclusion of
194. See supra Part II.A-B.
195. "[The right to religious liberty is a right to government neutrality." Laycock, Theology
Scholarships, supra note 8, at 177. Cf Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,
49-52 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Establishment Clause does not confer
any substantive right and is rather only a concept of federalism that should only apply to the
federal government, thus rejecting incorporation).
196. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 93, at 7 (statement by Narda Pierce,
counsel for petitioner).
197. See supra Part I.B.
198. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). With incorporation, a state must respect the
doctrinal refinements of the federal constitutional amendment that the federal courts have
defined. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra
note 8, at 176; A Federalist View, supra note 18, at 1708. See also supra Part IlI.A for a
discussion of the incorporation doctrine.
199. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 729 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia
explains, this would "just happen[] not to subsidize [religion]." Id.
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religious schools in the benefit, and it cannot, in the same breath, call on that same
constitution to deny the benefit to one majoring in theology, a religious endeavor. If
Washington had excluded all science majors because it wanted to enhance the
humanities degrees in the state of Washington, a student majoring in science probably
would not have a claim before the Court, but the Court has never stated that the Federal
Constitution requires a position of neutrality with regard to science degrees.200 The
Court has maintained a position of neutrality in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence;
since the Establishment Clause does affect Davey's claim, he has a right to the
protections and benefits of that neutrality.
CONCLUSION
By abandoning the neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause, the Court
allowed the State of Washington to deny Davey access to a benefit that was otherwise
generally available to all others who met the neutral criteria. Washington's justification
for this exception was its state antiestablishment principles, which are more restrictive
than that of the Federal Constitution and, arguably, impermissible under the Court's
previous Establishment Clause jurisprudence. If the Court continues to maintain the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause, applying its force and doctrine against the
States, the Court must require the States to also maintain a position of neutrality. With
Davey, States have the discretion to exclude religious adherents from generally
available funding, specifically because of the religious nature of the potential
beneficiaries. The States now have too much power to encroach upon religious liberties
and equality by treating religious adherents differently than the nonreligious.
Since it is doubtful the Court will abandon the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause, it should afford citizens the protections of the Establishment Clause principles
when neither Free Exercise rights nor Free Speech rights are able to protect the
religious adherent from being discriminated against-the "play in the joints" area of
Religion Clause jurisprudence that has always been troublesome. The Court should
adhere to the principle declared in Everson that first incorporated the Establishment
Clause: "[The First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to
favor them.' '2° 1 The State of Washington acted as Davey's "adversary" when it denied
him the scholarship based on Davey's individual choice to pursue a theology degree.
As a religious classification, this exclusion from the Promise Scholarship runs afoul of
the Establishment Clause and its neutrality principles.
200. See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 8, at 176.
201. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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